Old Dominion University

ODU Digital Commons
Philosophy Faculty Publications

Philosophy & Religious Studies

2015

Social Media and the Organization Man
Dylan E. Wittkower
Old Dominion University, dwittkow@odu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/philosophy_fac_pubs
Part of the Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons, and the Social Media Commons
Repository Citation
Wittkower, Dylan E., "Social Media and the Organization Man" (2015). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 15.
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/philosophy_fac_pubs/15

Original Publication Citation
Wittkower, D.E. (2015). Social media and the organization man. APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers, 14(2), 16-20.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy & Religious Studies at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@odu.edu.

NEWSLETTER | The American Philosophical Association

Philosophy and Computers
SPRING 2015

VOLUME 14 | NUMBER 2

FROM THE GUEST EDITOR
John P. Sullins

NOTES FROM THE COMMUNITY ON PAT SUPPES
ARTICLES
Patrick Suppes

Patrick Suppes Autobiography
Luciano Floridi

Singularitarians, AItheists, and Why the Problem with Artificial Intelligence is H.A.L.
(Humanity At Large), not HAL
Peter Boltuc

First-Person Consciousness as Hardware
D. E. Wittkower

Social Media and the Organization Man
Niklas Toivakainen

The Moral Roots of Conceptual Confusion in Artificial Intelligence Research
Xiaohong Wang, Jian Wang, Kun Zhao, and Chaolin Wang

Increase or Decrease of Entropy: To Construct a More Universal Macroethics (A
Discussion of Luciano Floridi’s The Ethics of Information)
VOLUME 14

|

NUMBER 2

© 2015 BY THE A MERIC AN PHILOSOPHIC AL A SSOCIATION

SPRING 2015

ISSN 2155-9708

APA NEWSLETTER | PHILOSOPHY AND COMPUTERS

Social Media and the Organization Man
D. E. Wittkower
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSIT Y

In an age of social media we are confronted with a problem
novel in degree if not in kind: being called to account for
the diﬀerences between presentations of self appropriate
within a variety of group contexts. Business news in the
post-Facebook era has been replete with stories about
privacy fails, large and small—employees fired or denied
promotion seemingly due to same-sex relationships
revealed on social media, career advice to college students
about destroying online evidence of having done normal
college-student things, and so on. Keeping work and
private lives separate has become more diﬃcult, and
diﬃcult in diﬀerent ways, and we are living in a new era of
navigating self- and group-identities.
While social media in general tends to create these
problems, Facebook, with its unitary profile, single Friend
list, and real-name policy, has been central to creating this
new hazardous environment for identity performance. Mark
Zuckerberg is quoted in an interview with David Kirkpatrick
saying, “You have one identity. . . . The days of you having
a diﬀerent image for your work friends or co-workers and
for the other people you know are probably coming to an
end pretty quickly. . . . Having two identities for yourself is
an example of a lack of integrity.”1 Many have critiqued this
simplistic view of identity, but Michael Zimmer’s widely
read blog post on the topic is particularly pithy and direct:
Zuckerberg must have skipped that class
where Jung and Goﬀman were discussed.
Individuals are constantly managing and restricting
flows of information based on the context they
are in, switching between identities and persona.
I present myself diﬀerently when I’m lecturing in
the classroom compared to when I’m having a beer
with friends. I might present a slightly diﬀerent
identity when I’m at a church meeting compared
to when I’m at a football game. This is how we
navigate the multiple and increasingly complex
spheres of our lives. It is not that you pretend
to be someone that you are not; rather, you turn
the volume up on some aspects of your identity,
and tone down others, all based on the particular
context you find yourself.2
And this view of the complexity of managing selfpresentations within diﬀerent organizational contexts,
destructive as it already is to Zuckerberg’s—well, it’s hard
to say . . . simplistic? Naïve? Unrealistic? Hetero- and Cisprivileged? Judgmental? All of these, I suppose—at any
rate, to Zuckerberg’s faulty view of multiple identities as
“a lack of integrity,” this view doesn’t even yet consider
that diﬀerent elements of identity may need to be not
merely emphasized or toned down in diﬀerent contexts,
but that integral aspects of identity may need to be hidden
entirely in some contexts and revealed only in others.
Zimmer is aware of this too, and quotes an appropriately
pseudonymous comment on Kieran Healy’s blog post on
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the topic, that “Nobody puts their membership in Alcoholics
Anonymous on their CV.”3 Surely we ought to say that if
anything demonstrates integrity, it would be admitting
a diﬃcult truth about oneself and seeking support with
others through a frank relationship of self-disclosure,
making the AA example particularly apt, not least since the
“anonymous” part of AA recognizes that this sort of integrity
requires a safe separation of this organizational identity
from other aspects of one’s life, of which the contents of a
CV is only one particular example, dramatic in its absurdity.
Zuckerberg, for his part, seems to have started to think
diﬀerently about this, stating in a 2014 interview that
I don’t know if the balance has swung too far, but
I definitely think we’re at the point where we don’t
need to keep on only doing real identity things
[. . .] If you’re always under the pressure of real
identity, I think that is somewhat of a burden.4
The 2010 comments are still important for us to take
seriously, though. Not so much because Zuckerberg’s
comments reveal a design trait in the Facebook platform
that has changed how we think about and perform identity
(although this is interesting as well!). But even more so
because if Zuckerberg, mired as he is in thinking about
how people manage self- and group identities, can fall into
a way of thinking so disconnected from the actual conduct
of lives, there must be something deeply intuitive, perhaps
seductive, about this way of thinking about integrity.
At the heart of this intuition is a modern individualist
notion of the self—the self which rights-bearing, with an
individual and separable existence; the juridical self. We
must assume an integral self logically prior to organizational
and communal entanglement in order to pass judgment
on whether it is limited, transformed, disfigured, hidden,
or altered by its entrance into and representation within
groups and contexts. We tend to take on a “correspondence
theory” of integrity, parallel to the correspondence theory
of truth, in which a self-representation is to have greater
or lesser integrity depending upon the degree of similarity
that it bears to some a priori “true” self. This view of an
“unencumbered self” is deeply mistaken as Sandel (1984)
among others has pointed out, but is logistically central to
our liberal individualist conception of rights and community
and thus hard to avoid falling into. Zuckerberg may do well
to read philosophy in addition to the remedial Goﬀman
(1959) to which Zimmer rightly wishes to assign him.

INTEGRITY AND SELF-PERFORMANCE

Turning to philosophical theories of personal identity seems
at first unhelpful. Whether, for example, we adopt a bodycontinuity or mind-continuity theory of identity has only the
slightest relevance to what might count as “integrity”—in
fact, it seems any perspective on philosophical personal
identity must view “integrity” as either non-optional or
impossible; more a metaphysical state than a moral value.
But even within, e.g., the Humean view that the self is no
more than a theater stage on which impressions appear
in succession5 fails to preclude that there may be some
integral self—Hume’s claim applies only to the self as
revealed by introspection, as Kant pointed out in arguing
SPRING 2015 | VOLUME 14 | NUMBER 2
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for the idealism of the transcendental unity of apperception
(1998); a grammatical necessity, as it were, corresponding in
unknowable ways to the noumenal reality, which, however,
is not necessarily less real for its unknowability. Indeed,
when we look to Hume’s (2012) theory of moral virtue, we
see it is based upon sentiment and sympathy rather than
following moral rules or calculation, implying that we have
these acquired and habitual attributes which constitute our
moral selves, even if they are not the “I” of the “I think”
which accompanies all representations. Even reductive and
skeptical positions within philosophical theories of personal
identity make room for habit, character, and some sort of
content to the self, inaccessible through introspection
though it might be, which is subject to change and growth,
and which is if not an origin then at least a conditioning
factor in the determination of our thought and action.
We could do worse than to turn to Aristotle for an account
of this.6 An Aristotelian view of character has the significant
virtue of viewing identity as both real and consequential as
well as also being an object of work. We have on his view a
determinate character—e.g., we may, in fact, be a coward.
But in this view we still need not fall into Sartrean bad faith,
for a coward need not be a coward in the sense that Sartre’s
waiter is a waiter.7 A coward may be a coward, but may
nevertheless be brave in this or that particular situation—
and through an accretion of such instances of bravery, may
become brave rather than cowardly. Aristotle, along with
AA, tells us to “fake it ‘til you make it,” and both rightly
view this “faking it” as a creation of integrity, not a mere
demonstration of its absence.
On a correspondence theory of integrity, this self-conscious
performance of a character which we do not possess
appears as false representation, but this makes sense
only when we assume a complete, settled, and coherent
character. We say someone is “acting with integrity” when
she takes an action in accordance with her values and
principles, even or especially when it goes against her selfinterest. Integrity, then, is not a degree of correspondence
between character and behavior, but between values
and behavior. One can even act with integrity by going
against one’s character, as in the case of the coward who
nonetheless stands up for what she believes in a dangerous
situation; the alcoholic entering recovery who aﬃrms “I am
intemperate” and concludes “therefore I will not drink.”8
The sort of identity relevant to integrity, then, is not personal
identity in a philosophical sense (for the mere unity of
apperception is not a thing to which I can stay true), nor is
it one’s actual character or habits (for to reduce oneself to
one’s history and habits is bad faith, and acting according
to our habits could well lead us away from integrity if our
habits are vicious). Instead, the relevant sort of identity must
be that with which we identify. Certainly we can recognize
that we have traits with which we do not identify, and the
process of personal growth is the process of changing
our character in order to bring it into accordance with the
values we identify with. As Suler has argued, disinhibition
does not necessarily reveal some “truer self” that lies
“underneath” inhibitions; disinhibition may instead make
us unrecognizable to ourselves.9 Our inhibitions—at the
least the ones we value; which we identify with—are part of
SPRING 2015 | VOLUME 14 | NUMBER 2

the self that we recognize as ourselves, and inhibitions may
themselves be the product of choice and work.

INTEGRITY IN AN ORGANIZ ATIONAL CONTEXT

We need not fall into a correspondence theory of integrity or
adopt a liberal individualist conception of the self in order
to recognize that organizational contexts present problems
for personal integrity. Two primary sorts come immediately
to mind: (1) that organizational contexts may exert
influences rendering it more diﬃcult to act with integrity, as
in familiar cases such as conformity and groupthink; and (2)
that organizational contexts may contain hostility towards
certain self-identifications, making self-performance with
integrity dangerous. The second kind of problem is the sort
most obviously presented by social media in novel ways,
and will be our focus here, but by the end of this chapter
we’ll have some insights on the first as well.
Conflicts between aspects of self-identity in diﬀerent
contexts certainly do not arise for the first time with
social media, and are not limited to identities which are
discriminated against. One does not, for the most part,
discuss one’s sex life in church, even if that sex life takes
place within marriage—and within a straight marriage, and
involves “vanilla sex” rather than BDSM, and so on. And yet
it is not without reason that recent years have seen renewed
and intensified discussion of managing boundaries
between personal and professional life, and the tendency
of social media to either blur or overlap contexts of identity
performance has created a new environment of identity
performance causing new requirements for thinking about
and managing identities.10
In contemporary digital environments, we are frequently
interacting simultaneously with persons from diﬀerent
personal and social contexts. Our friends and followers in
social networking sites (SNS) are promiscuously intermixed.
We have only a single profile in each, and we cannot
choose which profile items—gender identity, religious
identity, former employers, name—are viewable to which
connections or groups of connections in our network.
Nor can we choose to have diﬀerent presentations for
diﬀerent connections or groups: we may portray ourselves
diﬀerently in social or work contexts, but can choose only
a single profile picture. There are work-arounds, of course,
but they are onerous, diﬃcult to maintain, and sometimes
violate terms of service agreements requiring single
accounts and real names. Even using built-in aﬀordances
intended to aid in maintaining contextual integrity,11 such as
private accounts (Twitter), friend lists (Facebook), or circles
(Google+), is diﬃcult and socially risky: diﬃcult because
managing such aﬀordances requires significant upkeep,
curation, memory, and attention; risky because members
of groups of which we are members tend to have their
own separate interconnections, online or oﬀ, and eﬀective
boundary enforcement must include knowledge of these
interconnections and accurate prediction of information
flows across them. If you wish to convince your parents that
you’ve quit Facebook, how far out in their social networks
must you go in excluding friends from viewing your posts?
Aunts and uncles? Family friends? Friends of friends of
family? Or, in maintaining separation of work and personal
life, how are you to know whether a Facebook friend or
PAGE 17
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Twitter follower might know someone in your oﬃce well
enough to mention that “Oh, I know a co-worker of yours!
Sounds like you have some serious HR issues . . .” Social
media is indeed connecting us more than ever before, but
there are many significant silos the structural integrity of
which we wish to maintain.
These social silos were previously maintained not only by
non-simultanous interactions with diﬀerent groups and
organizational contexts, but also by the mundane barriers
of time and space, missing in digital and especially in SNS
environments. In our oﬄine lives, when one is in church
one is not also simultaneously in the oﬃce, in one’s tennis
partner’s car on a family vacation, in one’s adult children’s
living rooms—and, similarly, when one is out on the town, it
is not also simultaneously the morning after, next Monday
at lunch break, and five years later while interviewing for a
new position. Digital media do not limit information flows
through time and space the same ways as do physically
based interactions, and our ability to predict to where
information may flow and how it may matter to others and
in other contexts—and to project that prediction indefinitely
into the future and in relation to concerns which our future
selves may have—is obviously insuﬃcient to inoculate
ourselves against the “privacy virus” that SNS presents.12
Worse still, in the absence of these mundane architectural
barriers of time and space, and the social barriers to which
they give rise, even our most thoughtful connections may
not be able to accurately perceive and maintain the limits
on information flows which we seek to maintain.
The co-worker who we run into at the gay bar, regardless of
his sexual orientation, must have overcome potential social
barriers by being suﬃciently comfortable with presence in a
context and location where a sexualized same-gender gaze
is considered normal and proper rather than deviant. Given
these mundane conditions, those who may bump into a
co-worker at the gay bar—whether they be taking part in a
community of common self-identification, or whether they
be gay-friendly straights who are there to see a drag show,
or because it’s just the best place in town to go dancing—
can at least know that the other party has similarly passed
through these social filters. Although it may not be known
by either party what has brought the other there, both are
“insiders” insofar as they have each met these conditions,
and are thus aware that this knowledge of one another,
conditioned by this limited mode of access, ought to be
treated as privileged information to be transmitted only
selectively.
By contrast, identification of sexual orientation through SNS
profile data requires only a connection of any kind arising
within any context in order to grant access to potentially
sensitive information. But even without this self-disclosure,
all contacts from all contexts are welcome in the virtual gay
bar that may be overlaid on the SNS user’s page and feed.
A vague work contact, made at a professional conference,
is invited along to passively overhear conversations within
communities which he might never have been invited and
might never have made himself a party to—even if a user,
for example, posts news of gay marriage legal triumphs and
vacation pictures with her partner only to a limited “close
friends” list, her page nonetheless remains a venue in which
PAGE 18

conversations take place within overlapping contexts. A
public post absent identity markers, a popular music video,
for example, may receive a simple comment from an “ingroup” friend (e.g., “Too bad she’s straight!”), and through
such interactions a potentially sensitive social context may
coalesce around all those participants and passive viewers
present—and all this without the “in-group” friend having
any cues that she has broken down a silo. How are we to
know which of a friend’s user-defined groups we are in,
and how they are organized?
These eﬀects are related to prior theorizations of Meyrowitz’s
“middle region,” Papacharissi’s “publicly private and
privately public spaces,” and Marwick and boyd’s “context
collapse.”13 What is perhaps most distinctive about this
particular case is the way these identity performances are
tied to unitary SNS profiles and take place within shifting
and interlocking publicities rather than across a public/
private divide. We are not seeing the private leaking out into
the public so much as we are seeing a variety of regional
publics overlaid upon one another. In this, we are called
to account for our contextual identities in a new way: our
selves are displayed, through both our actions as well as
through others’ interactions with us, simultaneously before
a multiplicity of audience with which we may identify in
diﬀerent ways.
This is the most peculiar challenge to integrity in an age
of social media: we can no longer work out our own idea
of how our values and commitments can harmonize into
an integral self. Siloed identity performances allow us
to perform those aspects of our identity, understood as
that version of ourselves with which we identify, which
fit within one context and another context, variously and
in sequence. We can be gay in one context, Muslim in
another, and a soldier in another still, and whether and to
what extent those identities can be integrated can largely
be sequestered as an issue for our own moral introspection
and self-labor. Once these identities must be performed
before a promiscuously intermixed set of audiences,
integrity in the sense of staying true to our values takes on
a newfound publicity, for we can no longer gain acceptance
within groups merely by maintaining the local expectations
for values and behaviors within each group in turn, but
instead must either (1) meet each and all local expectations
globally, (2) argue before others for the coherence of these
identities when they vary from expectations particular
to each group with which we identify, or (3) rebuild and
maintain silos where time, space, and context no longer
create them.
Indeed, so striking is this change that some have worried
whether we are losing our interiority altogether.

INTEGRITY AND THE “ORGANIZ ATION MAN”

The worry that maintaining multiple profiles, and with them
multiple selves, reflects a lack of integrity is a Scylla in the
anxieties of popular discourse about SNS to which there
is a corresponding Charybdis: the fear that an emerging
“let it all hang out” social norm will destroy the private self
altogether, and ring in a new age of conformity, where all
aspects of our lives become performances before (and by
implication for) others.
SPRING 2015 | VOLUME 14 | NUMBER 2
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There are, however, significant reasons to believe that, even
if our lives become ubiquitously subject to surveillance
and coveillance, this will not result in the exclusion of
expressions of marginalized identities or unpopular views.14
First, we see tendencies towards formation of social and
informational echo chambers, resulting in increasingly
extreme views rather than an averaging-out to moderate and
universally accepted views, as Sunstein has argued for and
documented at length.15 But, secondly, even insofar as we
do not separate ourselves out into social and informational
“Daily Me”s becoming a virtual “city of ghettos,” the messy
and contentious digital spaces in which we are called to
account for the integration of our multiple selves may tend
not only towards safe and “lowest-common denominator”
versions of self-expression, but also towards greater
visibility and impact of divergent views, and even a new
impetus away from conformity.16
Thus far we have considered how limiting information
flows across social and organizational contexts can
promote integrity, but it is certainly true as well that such
siloing of diﬀerent self-performances can support a lack
of integrity. Compartmentalization is a key tool in allowing
diﬀusion of responsibility. The employee who takes an
“I just work here” perspective in her professional life is
more likely to encounter productive cognitive dissonance
when participating in the mixed contexts of SNS in which
discussions with co-workers about their employer’s actions
are subject to viewing and commentary by other friends
who may view a corporate triumph as an environmental
disaster. The churchgoer who has come to a private peace
with her personal rejection of some sectarian dogmas may
be forced into a more vocal and public advocacy by having
to interact simultaneously with various and divergent
friends’ reactions to news of court rulings about abortion
rights.
In these sorts of cases, there is a clear threat to identity
performances, placing users into precarious positions
wherein they must defend and attempt to reconcile
seemingly incompatible group identifications—but this loss
in the user’s tranquility, in some cases, may bring with it a
gain in personal integrity and possibilities for organizational
reform. While it is certainly a bad thing that intermixing
of audiences may subject users to discrimination, and
separate performances of identities proper to diﬀerent
groups and contexts need not be indicative of a lack of
integrity, compartmentalization can also enable people to
act against their own values and stifle productive criticism
within organizations.
Luban et al. argue forcefully, with reference to the Milgram
experiment, that bureaucracies create a loss of personal
responsibility for collective outcomes, resulting in what
Arendt called “rule by nobody.”17 They suggest that
we should attempt to maintain adherence to our moral
values—maintain our integrity in the sense of staying
true to the version of ourselves with which we identify—
by analogy to how we think of our responsibility for our
actions when under the influence of alcohol. Just as we
plan in advance for our impaired judgment later by taking
a cab to the bar or designating a driver, so too, before we
enter into an organizational context we should be aware
SPRING 2015 | VOLUME 14 | NUMBER 2

that our judgment will become impaired by groupthink and
diﬀusion of responsibility, and work out ways in which we
can avoid making poor judgments under that organizational
influence. Social networks may metaphorically provide that
more-sober friend who asks “are you sure you’re okay to
drive?,” enabling our better judgment to gain a foothold.
Organizations may then have a similar relation to our integrity
as does our character. Our character is formed by a history
of actions and interactions, but we may not identify with
the actions that it brings us to habitually perform. When we
recognize our vices—e.g., intemperance—and seek to act
in accordance with our values and beliefs, we act against
our character and contribute thereby to reforming our habits
and character to better align with the version of ourselves
with which we identify. Organizations may similarly bring
us, through their own form of inertia and habituation, to act
in ways contrary to our values and beliefs. A confrontation
with this contradiction through context collapse may help
us to better recognize the organization’s vices and to act
according to the version of ourselves, in that organizational
context, with which we identify—and contribute thereby to
reforming our organization to better align with our values,
and with its values as well.
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The Moral Roots of Conceptual Confusion
in Artificial Intelligence Research
Niklas Toivakainen
UNIVERSIT Y OF HELSINKI

INTRODUCTION

I gather that it would not be an overstatement to claim that
the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research is perceived
by many to be one of the most fascinating, inspiring,
hopeful, but also one of the most worrisome and dangerous
advancements of modern civilization. AI research and
related fields such as neuroscience promise to replace
human labor, to make it more eﬃcient, to integrate robotics
into social realities,1 and to enhance human capabilities.
To many, AI represents or incarnates an important element
of a new philosophy of mind, contributing to a revolution
in our understanding of humans and life in general, which
is usually integrated with a vision of a new era of human
and super human intelligence. With such grandiose hopes
invested in a project it is nut surprising that the same
elements that invoke hope and enthusiasm in some,
generate anxiety and disquietude in others.2
While I will have things to say about features of these visions
and already existing technologies and institutions, the
main ambition of this paper is to discuss what I understand
to be a pervasive moral dimension in AI research. To
make my position clear from the start, I do not mean to
say that I will discuss AI from a moral perspective, as if
it could be discussed from other perspectives detached
from morals. I admit that thinking about morals in terms
of a “perspective” is natural if one thinks of morality as
corresponding to a theory about a separable and distinct
dimension or aspect of human life, and that there are
other dimensions or aspects, say, scientific reasoning for
instance, which are essentially amoral or “neutral” with
respect to morality. Granting that it is a common trait of
modern analytical philosophy and scientific thinking to
precisely presuppose such a separation between fact and
morality (or “value” as it is usually perceived), I am quite
aware that moral considerations enters into the discussion
of AI (as is the case for all modern techno-science) as a
distinct and separate consideration. Nevertheless, I will
not be concerned here with a critique of moral evaluations
relevant for AI research—as, for instance, an ethics
committee would be—but rather with radicalizing the
relationship between morality and techno-science.3 My
main claim in this paper will be that the project of AI—as
the project of any human endeavor—is itself inextricably
a moral matter. Much of what I will be doing here is to try
and articulate how this claim makes itself seen on many
diﬀerent levels in AI research. This is what I mean by saying
that I will discuss the moral dimensions of AI.

AI AND TECHNO-SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING
OF NATURE
The term “Artificial Intelligence” invites three basic
philosophical—i.e., conceptual—challenges: What is (the
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